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Winning the war on global warming requires slaugh-
tering some of environmentalism’s sacred cows… 
In the age of climate change, what matters most 
is cutting carbon dioxide and other green house 
gasses. That means rethinking everything you ever 
learned about being green.1
|Wired Magazine, June 2008|
The truth of the immediate experience of the world 
disappears by reason of the scientific interpretation 
of the world.2
|Martin Heidegger|
When attempting to respond to an endangered 
world it can be easy to fall into narrowly focused 
actions of resource management, technological 
intervention, or idealistic conservationism. Certainly 
a little of each of these is needed at one time or 
another. However, if we allow ourselves to slide 
into the haze of limited understanding, then we are 
destined to level down the complexities of nature, 
the environment, and the places we inhabit. The 
difficulty of approaching sustainability with holism 
and integrity is exacerbated by fears of declining 
fossil fuels and the spectre of global warming. These 
threats are certainly real, but reactive solutions in 
the face of fear will only lead to the new problems of 
the future. Thus, it is critical that we act but do not 
panic, moving forward to re-frame our actions within 
a more inclusive worldview.
Building practices contribute to environmental 
distress in large portions. In addition to the conspic-
uousness of procedures that are overtly insensitive 
there is a less obvious yet equally problematic 
phenomenon that occurs with technological ‘green’ 
design. Although technical innovation certainly 
aids the way in which we may build sustainably, 
falling into mere technological ‘fixes’ (as in other 
fields) further promotes decontextualised problem 
solving, thus perpetuating the isolating and atomis-
ing spiral that has raised environmental issues in 
the first place. For architecture, with interventions 
and modifications of the environment taking place 
by the minute, developing more nuanced strategies 
and methods must be the first (and most important) 
order of business. Without an attitude adjustment, 
not only will our material resources be threatened 
but increasingly the intangible resource of place too 
moves toward extinction.
Taking up the cause of the environment not only 
as nature but also as the built environments that 
humans create and inhabit should be a central 
concern of any movement toward sustainability. 
I draw this out because this is the nexus of real 
environmental design; that is to say the conserva-
tion of energy and materials must simply become 
non-negotiable, as without energy and materials 
we would be unable to even engage this conversa-
tion. Further, if these were the only things sustained 
then the experiential and atmospheric human envi-
ronments that, as Alberto Perez-Gomez once said, 
‘keep us from going back to our rooms and slitting 
our wrists’,3 are in serious jeopardy. In light of the 
potential disappearance of place it is important to 
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fulness of ‘being’. That is, its focus on ‘beings’ as 
extant entities, rather than ‘being’ as the basis upon 
which entities are understood. Inseparable from 
the question of being for Heidegger was ‘situated-
ness’, which has to do with the specific ‘worlded’ 
circumstances in which we primarily find ourselves. 
In other words, Heidegger sees that we are first and 
for the most part involved in particular contexts as 
opposed to existing as objective observers (which 
he understands to be the view of science and meta-
physics). This interdependence of world situation 
and human involvement as prior to scientific inquiry 
and categorisation is pointed to in lecture in 1927, 
as Heidegger says:
[C]hurches and graves are oriented in very defi-
nite directions. These regions under question here, 
for example, east, west, have no relation at all to 
geographical contexts but to sunrise and sunset, 
life and death, hence to Dasein [human existence] 
itself.6
Heidegger’s thinking about being progresses over 
the years as he moves from the earlier ‘meaning of 
being’ to the middle period’s ‘truth of being’, and in 
a seminar in 1969 he explains his subsequent shift 
into new territory, explaining that:
[I]n order to avoid a falsification of the sense of truth, 
in order to exclude its being understood as correct-
ness, ‘truth of being’ was explained by ‘location 
of being’ – truth as locality of being. This already 
presupposes, however, an understanding of the 
place-being of place. Hence the expression topol-
ogy of be-ing…7
With the transition into the ‘topology of being’ we 
see Heidegger’s work become place-specific and 
fall more deeply under the influence of the pre-
Socratics and the poet Hölderlin. This period also 
finds Heidegger wary of much of his former lexicon, 
eschewing words such as ‘being’, and ‘language’.8 
In this former terminology he sees words that 
acknowledge that the threat of environmental degra-
dation through unattuned building morphology is 
substantial and appears to be ever increasing. For 
these reasons recognising place as an issue funda-
mental to the question of sustainability is imperative. 
With this recognition it becomes clear that devel-
oping a way of living that is merely sustainable is 
not enough. This in turn is the moment where the 
design of the built environment perhaps rediscovers 
something more originary about itself, transitioning 
from the construction of individual creations toward 
the disclosure of places. It is with this shift that 
those experiences that move us, which are shaped 
by unique ecosystems, cultures, things, and people, 
are allowed to remain affectual. The phenomenon of 
place is precisely that which will provide the fortitude 
to press ahead into the unknown with an unflinching 
commitment to sustainability and an integral under-
standing of environmental design. In this way the 
problem of sustainability might be simply phrased 
as the prioritising of place in our world.
Thinking Topology 
In hopes of better understanding the forces at play 
in this dilemma this paper looks to the thinking of 
Martin Heidegger for clues. As one of the first expo-
nents of a philosophy that questioned the reductive 
proclivities of the Western metaphysical tradition, 
Heidegger was a ‘trenchant critic of space conceived 
as mere site’,4 pointing out that the Greeks had no 
word for space, ‘for they experienced the spatial on 
the basis … of place (topos)’.5 Through his ques-
tioning of the tradition Heidegger responded with an 
emphasis on relationships, context, and the unique 
experiences of the world encountered by us as 
embodied humans existingly. Heidegger’s work not 
only implicates the negative forces at work in this 
reduction, but also provides possibilities for re-invig-
orating our relations to building and place.
Heidegger is generally seen to have had three 
periods of thought during his career, all of which are 
concerned with the philosophical tradition’s forget-
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a place, as Ed Casey has suggested, that ‘things 
congeal the places we remember, just as places 
congeal remembered worlds’.12 This meshing of 
thing, place, and humans is the event of being 
(Ereignis) and is where Heidegger finds that instead 
of trying to explain the structure of experience (as in 
Being and Time) it is in fact more effective to evoke 
it directly. This is seen perhaps most clearly in ‘The 
Thinker as Poet’, as Heidegger (almost sounding 
East Asian13) sketches a series of lyrical vignettes 
drawing out the interrelation of place and thing. For 
example:
When the evening light, slanting into
the woods somewhere, bathes the tree 
trunks in gold…14
or:
When the wind, shifting quickly, grumbles
in the rafters of the cabin, and the
weather threatens to become nasty…15
With the play of immaterial phenomena in these 
works one sees the glimmerings of Heidegger’s 
‘fourfold’, which is the interplay of earth, sky, mortals, 
and divinities. In the play of the four Heidegger is 
able to reveal material and immaterial variability, as 
well as offering a poetic openness that holds things, 
humans, and the forces of nature together within 
the significance of place. Further, the broad stokes 
that Heidegger uses to paint these four allow much 
of his earlier thought to be embedded in them and 
thus be couched in the experience of the world.16 
In this way, the poetic for Heidegger has the ability 
to reveal things that are often concealed in logical 
rumination. Place is the ground for this revealing. 
Heidegger’s position is that place does not form 
out of extended space as the tradition has posited; 
rather, place is indicative of our very orientation 
within environments, and in this way the poetic 
interplay between things and location is seen to be 
fundamental to our being-in-the-world. The topology 
have become ossified and confusing through their 
everyday definability. It seems the habitual under-
standings Heidegger had attempted to revitalise 
through his technical retooling of them in his early 
work still left him a way of speaking that appeared 
to prioritise linearity, present-ness, and a subject-
object split. Heidegger speaks to this shift in his use 
of language in a seminar of 1966. The moderator 
explains Heidegger’s thoughts: 
But the language of Being and Time, Heidegger 
says, lacks assurance. For the most part, it still 
speaks in expressions borrowed from metaphysics 
and seeks to present what it wants to say through 
new coining, creating new words. Jean Beaufret 
mentions that in 1959 Hans Georg Gadamer said 
of his teacher: ‘Hölderlin first set his tongue loose.’ 
Heidegger now says, more precisely, that through 
Hölderlin he came to understand how useless it is 
to coin new words; only after Being and Time was 
the necessity of a return to the essential simplicity of 
language clear to him.9
So rather than trying to re-define terms or invent 
words, we see with the topology of being a link 
Heidegger is making between the existential struc-
tures of being and the world of involvement through 
the poetic embrace of everyday language. This 
adjustment allows Heidegger to highlight the proc-
esses, events, specificity, multiplicity, and uncertainty 
that he sees in the human encounter with the world 
through descriptions that directly mesh with this 
experience.10 This is an important point - Heidegger 
does not drop his earlier concerns, but rather finds 
that if he uses language more skilfully (within its 
limits) it allows him new ways to unfold his prior 
technical explications directly into the specific situ-
ations of place. With the tongue that was ‘freed by 
Holderlin’, Heidegger is able to express the idea he 
saw in the Greek topos, which was that, ‘the place 
belongs to the thing itself’.11 This is to say that there 
was a deep interrelation for Heidegger in humans’ 
understandings of place and the play of things in 
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mortals because they can die. To die means to 
be capable of death as death. Only man dies and 
indeed continually, as long as he remains on the 
earth, under the sky, before the divinities. When we 
speak of the mortals, we are already thinking the 
other three along with it, but we give no thought to 
the simple oneness of the four.
This simple oneness of the four we call the fourfold. 
Mortals are in the fourfold by dwelling.19
In taking up the fourfold it is best to follow 
Heidegger’s advice that, ‘if we speak of a thinker we 
must heed what is unsaid in what is said’.20 Combin-
ing this advice with the prior outline of Heidegger’s 
thinking, it becomes clear that a full reading of 
Heidegger’s later writing is only attained through 
a broad understanding of his thinking in general.21 
Although the fourfold clears away much of his think-
ing’s resemblance to metaphysical speculation and 
subject-oriented thought, the success of this assimi-
lation is also a primary reason that the fourfold is so 
beguiling. In order to be able to consider the fourfold 
in light of Heidegger’s earlier thought without, as 
Mark Wrathall warns, ‘doing violence to the text’,22 it 
is important to proceed cautiously, advancing slowly 
and assuredly by thinking along with Heidegger. 
This is done best by developing an ear for his 
language and keeping the phenomena close at all 
times. I mostly agree with Wrathall’s assertion that 
‘the four are meant, by Heidegger, quite literally’.23 
(as imposing metaphoric meaning obliterates the 
phenomena themselves); however, I do think one 
still needs to be vigilant of the processes at work 
here, as the mutability, ‘hidden riches that language 
holds in store…’,24 and interplay of the phenomena 
coupled with Heidegger’s poetic intent requires that 
we must undergo the experiences ourselves and 
measure these against the words so as to live the 
full implications of the text. To this end Heidegger 
suggests, ‘as soon as we have the thing before our 
eyes, and in our hearts an ear for the word, thinking 
prospers’.25
of being takes over the question of being and folds 
it into notions about cultivation, building, dwelling, 
and the presencing of place often demonstrated in 
Heidegger’s ‘exemplary cases of things-as-loca-
tions’.17 With this understanding we are now ready 
to consider the richness of Heidegger’s topology of 
being and how the fourfold in particular shows itself 
to be instructive in the pursuit of a sustainable built 
environment.  
Unfolding the Fourfold
‘Every interpretation, as Heidegger reminds us, is a 
translation and thus a transition from our own initial 
place to another one and from there back again to 
our own’.18
Heidegger describes the fourfold as follows:
 
Earth is the serving bearer, blossoming and fruiting, 
spreading out in rock and water, rising up into plant 
and animal. When we say earth, we are already 
thinking the other three along with it, but we give no 
thought to the simple oneness of the four.
The sky is the vaulting path of the sun, the course 
of the changing moon, the wandering glitter of the 
stars, the year’s seasons and their changes, the 
light and dusk of day, the gloom and glow of night, 
the clemency and inclemency of the weather, the 
drifting clouds and the blue depth of the ether. When 
we say sky, we are already thinking the other three 
along with it, but we give no thought to the simple 
oneness of the four.
The divinities are the beckoning messengers of the 
godhead. Out of the holy sway of the godhead, the 
god appears in his presence or withdraws into his 
concealment. When we speak of the divinities, we 
are already thinking the other three along with it, 
but we give no thought to the simple oneness of 
the four.
The mortals are the human beings. They are called 
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Heidegger tells us that, ‘phusis … can be observed 
everywhere, e.g. in celestial phenomena (the rising 
of the sun), in the rolling of the sea, in the growth of 
plants, in the coming forth of man and animal from 
the womb’.31 When Heidegger suggests that, ‘we 
must think time together with phusis’,32 he is rein-
forcing the idea that phusis is not to be equated with 
Modern conceptions of nature as object. Primor-
dial temporality permeates the fourfold: mortals 
die; earth is constantly growing and decaying; sky 
holds the passage of the seasons and the rising 
and setting sun; and divinities are fleeting in their 
appearances, and timeless in their existence. So 
immediately with the understanding of time, the 
ontology of the fourfold becomes more than simple 
objects standing in relation to one another. This is 
further amplified as Heidegger speaks of the ‘mirror-
play’ of the fourfold, by which he means that each 
element of the four mirrors and is mirrored in certain 
aspects of the others. For example, the very notion 
of season is tied to the witnessing mortals, and the 
growing earth depends on the rainfall and sunlight 
of the sky; the miracle of this convergence reveals 
the divinities which are in turn welcomed in by the 
mortals receiving of this event. 
Mortals connect with phusis in two primary ways. 
When things only ask for the mortals’ attentiveness 
in becoming things, such as a seed becoming a 
tree, this is the self-freeing of phusis. Things that do 
not free themselves need mortals’ poetic know-how 
or techne-poiesis to set them free. This attention to 
things as things is a saving that, in the language 
of ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’, ‘means to set some-
thing free into its own presencing’.33 In other words, 
when the thing is set to work as a thing it gathers 
an event. Dwelling and building are both activities 
of revealing this event and through revealing archi-
tecture begins the shift from individual creation to 
disclosure of place. 
The temporality of the fourfold is particularly critical 
to environmentally sensitive design as it reconnects 
Most architectural readings of the fourfold I have 
encountered have tended toward the literal, which, 
although not wholly incorrect, simply leaves too much 
out. Additionally, these readings often fragment the 
fourfold into a collection of static components (as 
opposed to the temporal forces that they are).26 So 
for example, dwelling is taken to be domiciles and 
the earth and sky are simply the ground we walk on 
and the sky overhead. This sort of reading focuses 
the fourfold too tightly, by simply looking into the 
way in which a building might stand on the horizon. 
The particular sensibilities of how a building meets 
the ground and reaches toward the sky are no small 
matter, as many buildings do not consider this basic 
question with any seriousness; however this ques-
tion is really quite basic and frankly in no need of 
the fourfold for its resolution. Further, this reading 
holds primarily visual focus and lends itself toward 
the objectifying tendencies of the metaphysical 
tradition. In order to allow Heidegger’s thinking to 
be vital, the fourfold asks for our participation within 
the temporality of place. 
The dwelling of mortals is the action that opens 
the understanding of temporality in the fourfold, 
where dwelling is the attentive activity of engage-
ment in which mortals take care of things. When 
one hears dwelling one should hear echoes of 
Heidegger’s earlier ‘being–in’ and its correspond-
ing temporal structures. As Heidegger says in The 
History of the Concept of Time, ‘dwelling is also 
taken here as taking care of something in intimate 
familiarity, being-involved-with’.27 So, with the four-
fold we move from being-in as in-volvement, to 
dwelling as in-habitation, where the everyday deal-
ings of involvement are associated with particular 
places.28 Central to the cultivating and construct-
ing that accompany dwelling (and the fourfold in 
general) is phusis.
Phusis is the pre-Socratic ‘self blossoming emer-
gence’29 of nature, and Heidegger understands 
phusis to include ‘becoming as well as being’.30 
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In the essay ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’, 
Heidegger famously cites the bridge as a thing 
gathering the banks of the river. In this gather-
ing we see things on both banks acting upon one 
another to form particular relations. In this descrip-
tion it becomes evident that ‘the actuality of things 
consists in their exercising the action of forces on 
each other’,40 and in so doing form specific places. 
For example, perhaps the bridge links a field and 
farmhouse, or maybe two cites, or city to nature 
preserve; in each case the relations are explicit 
and formed out of the force of particular things in 
dialogue with one another. In each different interac-
tion the bridge gathers a different place, and in turn 
becomes a different bridge. Seeing how this inter-
change relates to one’s experience of the world, it 
becomes clear ‘that things themselves are places 
and do not merely belong to a place’,41 as well as 
the converse, that ‘place always opens a region 
in which it gathers the things in their belonging 
together’.42 Here emerges the seed to begin think-
ing about a building as analogous to Heidegger’s 
thing.
In order to approach the building as thing one 
must also inquire into the nature of the relation 
between humans and things. Heidegger says that 
for humans ‘being-in-the-world … leaps toward us 
from the things’.43 This is the fundamental connec-
tion to the thing where humans find their orientation 
and identity, or as Maurice Merleau-Ponty says so 
eloquently, ‘colors, sounds, and things - like Van 
Gogh’s stars - are the focal points and radiance of 
being’.44 This is all to say that one’s daily concerns 
and involvements are structured around and facil-
itated by the things of one’s world. This notion is 
both poetic and pragmatic, because when things 
become mere objects for manipulation there is no 
longer the resilience required for the mirror play, and 
as a result the world begins to seem monochrome. 
Consequently, place is no longer understood with 
any degree of complexity and is slowly taken over 
by superficial understandings. In addition to under-
one to the processes of existence. Understanding 
the fourfold from a temporal perspective keeps the 
notion of place from turning into a nostalgic snap-
shot and affords a complexity not found in modern 
technological thinking. The temporal view of ‘earth’ 
stands in stark contrast to the enframing of earth as 
resource and opens up the self-revealing and simul-
taneous dark concealing of nature, as well as the 
specificity that emerges in things.34 Since ‘all unveil-
ing requires an antecedent illumination’,35 we find 
the sky to play the counterpart to the darkness of 
the earth, in that the sky is the lighting that illumi-
nates certain potentialities of earth as seen in the 
rain and sunlight that aid life’s striving toward telos, 
as well as the less apparent ‘lighting’ of the back-
ground of a shared history, language, or culture. 
These worlded phenomena relate sky to being, as 
Heidegger says that the ‘understanding of being 
already moves in a horizon that is everywhere illu-
minate, giving luminous brightness’.36 The light of 
the sky provides everyday intelligibility. The tempo-
rality of sky is most closely related to our world time 
through the seasons and the daily passage of the 
sun, where ‘the sun is not understood as an astro-
nomical thing but as something environmentally on 
hand constantly used in everyday concern, namely 
as that which gives light and warmth in the cycle of 
day and night’.37 Time is one among many examples 
of how the fourfold weds ontology with place, in that 
with the fourfold time is always ‘world time’—that 
is to say, time is always determined in reference to 
human experience of events.38 Place begins to take 
shape as the intertwining of earth and sky, revealed 
as climates, ecologies, landforms, and cultures. In 
this way temporality allows the constant becoming 
of place, which is gathered around things. 
Building Things 
Each one of us is what he pursues and cares for 
… as the Dasein gives itself over immediately 
and passionately to the world itself, its own self is 
reflected to it from things.39
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each bring a specific gathering of the fourfold. This 
gathering appears to be a fundamental basis for an 
architecture of place and by association, an envi-
ronmental architecture.  
However, in attempting to foster an environmental 
architecture understanding the thing is not enough 
to ensure success. Although the thing is the nexus 
gathering the fourfold, all aspects of the fourfold 
must be ‘working’ in their full depth so as to allow the 
thing to thing. This requirement of the gathering is 
important as its requisite multiplicity invalidates the 
idea of creation as a product of singular genius, that 
is to say, it is not enough to engage in a simple one 
to one, creator-created relation. The simple creator-
created relation yields objects, which (intended or 
not) in their mere being somewhere puts them in 
relation to the fourfold. However, objects gather 
the fourfold according to their object-ness, which is 
to say that by being an object it is in their nature 
to stand out against the fourfold, thus revealing 
the four as simply four other objects. Returning to 
the temporality and multiplicity fundamental to the 
conception of the fourfold, it is clear that this sort 
of relation will be limited if not dysfunctional, as it 
results in simple relations and reductions that are 
not reflective of an experience of the world in its full-
ness. In order to engage a making that reveals and 
intertwines the temporal complexity of the fourfold 
with the thing, one must assume ownership of the 
way in which the process of design is undertaken. 
This requires humans to act as mortals, or in this 
case, designers to act as mortals. 
Designers as Ends
So as to understand the connotations of viewing 
the process of design from the perspective of the 
mortals, it is necessary that we first understand 
what is implied in the notion of being mortal. The 
mortals hold much of Heidegger’s earlier Dasein, 
in that mortals are the ‘now’ of time, and the ‘here’ 
of space, and their existence is centred around the 
concernful temporality of the care structure (i.e., the 
standing ourselves from things, the thing is by 
Heidegger’s estimation also our peculiar way of 
relating to others. He describes this phenomenon in 
The History of the Concept of Time:
The tool I am using is bought by someone, the 
book is a gift from…, the umbrella is forgotten by 
someone. The dining-table at home is not a round 
top on a stand but a piece of furniture in a particular 
place, which itself has its particular places at which 
particular others are seated every day. The empty 
place directly [shows the]… absence of others.45
Understanding the significance of the thing returns 
for us the full implication of viewing building as thing. 
With much of the built environment defined by build-
ings, buildings are one of the primary articulators 
of place. As a thing, buildings too orient us to the 
world, provide structures for involvement and reveal 
the presence and absence of others. However, to 
have the ability to do this a building as a thing must 
also reflect the specificity of its situation. As David 
Weinberger explains, ‘the fourfold must in every 
case be gathered in a particular way … the jug can 
be what it is (i.e., a jug) because it gathers the four-
fold in a way that a sieve or a stool does not’.46 So 
too it is that each building must be conceived as 
a very specific thing, gathering the fourfold in its 
own peculiar way according to its circumstances. 
Taking Weinberger’s example further, it is not just 
that the jug is different than the sieve, but also that 
the jug of a religious ceremony is different from the 
jug used with dinner – each should gather the four-
fold in a way appropriate to its context. In the built 
environment this is an urging that each building find 
its own unique relation to its surroundings, require-
ments, and users: shaping them as well as letting 
itself be shaped. A building becomes the particular 
thing that it is by revealing the fourfold in a particu-
lar way in the particular place that it stands. This is 
seen in examples as diverse as the Acropolis, a log 
cabin, the Salk Institute, or Peter Zumthor’s Therme 
Vals. These types of particular attuned response 
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would be to think of death as object. So what does 
one do in order to be a mortal? Again, it must be 
seen as a way of being, and it seems some of the 
answer might be found in Heidegger’s interest in 
Kant. In his earlier lectures Heidegger points to 
Kant’s claim that ‘man is a being which exists as 
its own end’,51 and perhaps more interestingly that 
‘the moral person exists as its own end; it is itself an 
end’.52 So it might seem that being mortal implies 
engaging in an ongoing process of ends, and just 
as Kant in his categorical imperative instructs that 
people should always be treated as ends and never 
means, it might be suggested that Heidegger is 
expanding this imperative to include things as well.53 
In other words, things become ends in themselves 
on the condition that the one receiving them is also 
an end by being mindful of this interaction. This is the 
difficult but critical task of the mortals, as Heidegger 
tells us, for it is ‘by the means-end schema we block 
our view of the essential relations’.54 So, when one 
embraces ends of all magnitudes (physical death 
being a paradigm case), one reveals possibilities 
and may in turn act in accordance with them. Expe-
riencing ‘death as death’ is how ‘the world and our 
being-in-it show themselves purely and simply’.55 
That is, we are most aware when we (as an end) 
allow things, people, and events to touch our fini-
tude, as this is what activates our ability to listen, 
see, and ultimately to care. For designers this point 
appears fundamental, since with this disposition the 
world is no longer allowed to become an object for 
management and control, rather it stands as the 
very source of inspiration. Further, taking ends as 
ends undermines the self-referential model of the 
Romantic genius, as experiencing ends requires 
that one become absorbed beyond themselves, in 
the things immediately before them. If a place is 
to be disclosed as place then a designer becomes 
mortal by developing into a receiver that allows the 
speaking of the world to become audible. In this 
way, when designers act as mortals they become a 
‘standing open for … being addressed by things’,56 
and it is this openness to the ‘things’ of any project, 
world matters in particular ways according to past 
engagements and future possibilities). Heidegger’s 
‘mortals’, however, are changed in interesting ways 
from his earlier notion of Dasein. Where Dasein 
has been often misconstrued as another word for 
the subject, the mortals are now clearly many --all 
of us. Also with the mortals becoming only one of 
the four of the fourfold (as opposed to the centre), 
it is suggested that we as humans do not create 
the world through our action. Rather it is mortals’ 
participation with things that enables the mirror-play 
of four. In fact the focus created by the mortals in 
staying with things is a crucial role; as Heidegger 
says, ‘staying with things is the only way in which 
the fourfold stays within the fourfold is accom-
plished at any time in simple unity’.47 It is through 
this conception of the mortals that Heidegger 
re-frames one’s responsibility as a human being to 
be primarily one of attentiveness and openness (not 
agency). Heidegger drives this home in a variety of 
places, saying that ‘mortals nurse and nurture the 
things that grow, and specially construct the things 
that do not grow’;48 ‘mortals speak insofar they 
listen’;49 ‘dwelling is the manner in which mortals 
are on the earth [… ] the fundamental character 
of dwelling is this sparing and preserving’.50 All of 
these statements speak to a more receptive and 
responsive notion of being human than many are 
normally accustomed to. However, perhaps ringing 
most loudly in the notion of the human as mortal 
is the darkness of death. In this we see Heidegger 
linking existence directly to death, which eliminates 
his earlier talk of Dasein being either authentic or 
inauthentic, in their ‘being-toward-death’. In either 
case death might be understood as a physical ceas-
ing-to-be, but perhaps more importantly should also 
be unpacked as contingency, vulnerability, and the 
partaking of ends as ends. In the mortals Heidegger 
makes being-toward-death and existence insepara-
ble. 
But what does this really mean—that one should 
be constantly thinking about mortality? No, this 
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this something befalls us, strikes us, comes over us, 
overwhelms and transforms us’.64 With this informa-
tion the interpretation of the divinities gains traction 
and one begins to see links between the divinities of 
the fourfold (as an experience in the world) and the 
phenomenon of stimmung of Being and Time. For 
environmental design this highlights the importance 
of atmosphere to the significance of place in that it 
is the ethereal experience of mood that is place and 
has caused many to speak of genus loci or the spirit 
of place. 
An encounter with divinity that is grounded in 
the experience of the world is consistent with 
Malpas’ reading of the divinities, as he advises 
that ‘Heidegger’s gods should not be construed as 
‘supernatural’ in any of the usual ways’. In attempt-
ing to comprehend mood, Hubert Dreyfus points out 
that although mood is often thought to be a personal 
emotion, it is important to remember that mood is 
in-the-world, that it comes to us from our dealings 
within a situation. Dreyfus explains that Heidegger 
also has in mind other things when he speaks of 
stimmung:
[M]ood can refer to the sensibility of an age (such 
as romantic), the culture of a company (such as 
aggressive), the temper of the times (such as revo-
lutionary), as well as the mood in a current situation 
(such as the eager mood in the classroom) and, 
of course, the mood of an individual. These are all 
ways of finding that things matter. Thus they are all 
ontic specifications of affectedness, the ontologi-
cal existential condition that things always already 
matter.65
The ek-static structure of stimmung is consist-
ent with the significance of the ‘reciprocal relation’ 
between mortals and divinities. The notion of divini-
ties as stimmung makes clear the nature of this 
reciprocation, in that the divinities announce them-
selves as a pervasive atmosphere that light up 
one’s engagement with a specific situation, much 
that welcomes the divinities.
The Place of the Divinities
The arrival of the divinities is the announcement of 
place. This is to say the divinities bring the all-en-
compassing (and sometimes overwhelming) sense 
of the whole that one encounters in being situated 
in different locales. Buildings as things often struc-
ture and sometimes crystallise this encounter in 
their presence; as Heidegger says of the temple, 
‘[its] standing there, opens a world’.57 Jeff Malpas 
explains that of the four elements in the fourfold the 
divinities ‘present the greatest difficulty for contem-
porary readers’,58 and ‘that part of the difficulty 
resides in the common tendency to think of the gods 
in religious terms’.59 Damon Young reinforces this 
thought by suggesting that, ‘Heidegger’s notion of 
divinity cannot be understood outside its context of 
poetic phenomenological hermeneutics’.60 Seeking 
a deeper interpretation in a 1942 lecture course 
on Parmenides, Heidegger foreshadows the inter-
play of the fourfold: ‘the Greeks neither fashioned 
the gods in human form nor did they divinize man 
… they experienced the gods and men in their 
distinct essence, and in their reciprocal relation’.61 
In his commentary on this same lecture, Malpas 
suggests that to understand the divinities one must 
keep in mind that ‘much of Heidegger’s thinking 
about the gods is determined by Greek thought 
and experience’,62 and in the Parmenides course 
Heidegger explains that for the Greeks the gods were 
the ‘attuning ones’, as well as  ‘Being itself’.63 These 
comments are intriguing because Heidegger tells us 
in Being and Time that being is not to be confused 
with a supreme being (the so-called ontotheological 
view), and further that when Heidegger speaks of 
attunement in Being and Time he is drawing upon 
the German word stimmung, a word that means both 
attunement and mood. The possibility of divinities 
understood as mood is echoed in a statement in the 
essay ‘The Nature of Language’, where Heidegger 
says that, ‘to undergo an experience with some-
thing – be it a thing, a person, or a god – means that 
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as neutral. For example, if a structure is built reduc-
tively as an object on a ‘site’ and is conceived only 
in terms of function, the commencement of human 
inhabitation will still transform it into a place (and in 
this case probably not a very positive one). In this 
way if a developer were to clear a ‘site’ investing in 
a new ‘apartment building’, this form of instrumental 
thinking will more likely than not find its resonance as 
brutal, banal, uninspiring, etc. This reflects the fact 
that for those who are to live in this apartment the 
‘site’ of the ‘apartment’ becomes the ‘place’ of their 
‘home’. In a place so conceived as this, chances 
of it fostering any reciprocation will be slim, most 
likely tenants would experience the place of their 
home at best as inoffensive, at worst life draining. 
This example shows the divinities in their equally 
powerful negative aspect that is frequently called 
into being by the objects that dot our landscapes 
and call themselves buildings. Now this is certainly 
not endorsing a need for ‘high’ design, rather simply 
an ability and willingness for those involved in all 
aspects of such a building project to see the bigger 
picture and seek to give something back. As mortals 
we are all in this together. In the particular case of 
housing perhaps the quintessential example of an 
attuned, responsive, and resourceful architecture is 
found in the work of someone like Michael Pyatok, 
who does wonderful things with limited means, 
utilising ‘an array of participatory design methods’.67 
In this way, understanding the fourfold shows that 
it is not if, but how a place is gathered that is most 
consequential. Because mood is always associated 
with place, if we as designers do not act (in either 
affirmation or positive correction) as ends within 
the context of the mortals (i.e. humanity) then we 
are not being sensitive to places as they stand in 
their complex totality, and our interventions and the 
ensuing human encounters with them will become 
increasingly Boschean. 
This is where environmental design must come 
back to the art of architecture as the cultivating 
and crafting of things in relation to phusis. With this 
like the Homeric gods did in colouring encounters 
as belligerent, fortuitous, amorous, and so on. 
Unlike the everyday intelligibility offered by the light 
of the sky, the light of the divinities is more emotion-
ally charged, which raises another nuance of the 
fourfold. Instead of limiting the divinities’ presence 
to the typically religious notion of God as sacro-
sanct, stimmung frees this shining of the gods to 
be much more broadly influential. In this way the 
presence of the divinities can show up as sacred or 
irreverent, happy or sad, inspiring or bland as well 
as more subtly tinged shades. This inclusive view 
is consistent with Heidegger’s repeated calls for 
openness and resoluteness, and offers a continuum 
for understanding the ‘holy sway’, corroborated by 
Heidegger’s suggestion that ‘secular spaces are 
always the privation of often very remote sacred 
spaces’.66 In this understanding, the experience of 
the divinities moves from being something abso-
lute, moralising, and singular to a question of how a 
person allows a mood to resonate, i.e. simply, is the 
experience of life taken up with awe? This question 
is perhaps the question for the future of a planet that 
sustains humanity.  
The Mood of Place
The gathering of place, reflected as identity and 
orientation in things, is that which is basic to the 
determination of whether we live in a world worth 
saving. Going back to the object/thing distinction, 
the pivotal understanding to glean in this discourse is 
that environments will be gathered by the presence 
of a building (regardless of intent) and this gathering 
is open to both positive and negative results. This is 
where understanding the divinities in terms of stim-
mung is so important. There will always be some 
pervasive mood present in a situation, and so the 
question becomes, what is the effect of said mood? 
It is this revelatory aspect of the particular thing 
in the fourfold that helps us to see that a building 
becomes a particular place (for better or for worse) 
whether we plan for it or not. The importance of this 
is that we as human beings do not experience things 
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environmental design: providing opposition to the 
levelling that inevitably results from a technologi-
cal worldview. A reinvestment in place might be the 
greatest hope for a turning toward an ecological 
epoch, as the environment does not need our reac-
tive ‘fixes’; it needs our listening response. Engaging 
the poetics of the fourfold brings out the significance 
of Heidegger’s topology to environmental concerns 
and, in seeking a reciprocal relationship between 
architecture and the environment, the fourfold 
suggests how, as a building becomes a specific 
thing gathering earth, sky, mortals, and divinities, it 
becomes a particular place.
 
In the end it is not important that all minutiae of 
Heidegger’s corpus be drawn out from the fourfold 
so that it be effectual, rather simply that the depth 
of Heidegger’s thinking inform the way in which 
one sees their place on the earth. Further, realising 
the fourfold’s location-centric and temporal charac-
ter demonstrates why any atomistic reading of its 
elements is both invalid and unhelpful. Drawing out 
the implications of the fourfold brings a revelation 
of how the intelligibility of our existence is tied to 
place and how our inhabitation of particular places 
is a continual process of transfiguration. This in turn 
suggests why place might prefigure any notions of 
environmentalism, sustainability, or green building, 
as these all have the preservation and disclosure 
of place at their core. Place is the nearness that 
calls us to dwell as mortals on the earth, under the 
sky, in the light of the divinities. With this awareness 
one finds not only that place precedes space, but 
perhaps place also precedes sustainability.
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